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FROM EARL WARREN TO WENDELL GRIFFEN: A STUDY OF
JUDICIAL INTIMIDATION AND JUDICIAL SELF-RESTRAINT
HonorableRobert L. Brown*
I. INTRODUCTION

It is a matter of the greatest personal satisfaction for me to be here today to speak at this symposium, which is being held in honor of the late
Judge Richard Sheppard Arnold. Judge Arnold was a close friend whom I
admired and loved. I am sure he is looking down today on these events with
great pleasure and pride.
I must also confess that I stopped wearing bowties in the 70s with the
exception of black tie, to my wife Charlotte's total chagrin. But in honor of
Richard Arnold, I broke down, and I'm wearing one today. It is actually one
of Richard's bowties which his widow, Kay, was kind enough to give me. I
decided that on this occasion, I had to wear it.
My topic for the symposium is From Earl Warren to Wendell Griffen:
A Study of Judicial Intimidation and Judicial Self-Restraint. Clearly, the
scope of my address is expansive. I will be discussing several facets of judicial independence. The most obvious is the danger to judicial impartiality
that comes from outside threats and retaliation following judicial decisions.
In addition to outside forces, I will be addressing self-imposed pressures
brought about by the judges themselves that affect the judges' impartiality. I
will also discuss the judicial boundaries for public comment, assuming there
are any left after Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.' And I will end
by touching on the always controversial subject of the activist judge. Is judicial activism judicial independence run amok? Justice Scalia certainly
thinks so.
There is no question that the role of judges is undergoing intense scrutiny and reevaluation in our society on many fronts and from many quarters.
The ultimate question posed is should there be any curbs or restraints on
judicial decision-making and if so, in what form? The corollary question
raised is how "active" do we want our judges to be? How active should they
be in their judicial decision-making, in announcing their views on disputed
issues in judicial campaigns, and in commenting on non-judicial issues as
sitting judges?

* Robert L. Brown is an Associate Justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court. He is a
graduate of the University of the South (B.A. 1963), Columbia University (M.A. 1965), and
the University of Virginia (J.D. 1968).
1. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
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II. EARL WARREN AND IMPEACHMENT

A.

Impeachment of Judges

I will deal first with public and legislative reactions to specific judicial
decisions and to so-called activist judges. I went to law school in the midsixties, some ten years after the two Brown2 decisions and after Reynolds v.
Sims, 3 Mapp v. Ohio,4 and the other landmark decisions of the Warren
Court. The Miranda decision would soon follow. 5 The tumult from these
decisions, and particularly the two Brown decisions followed by Cooper v.
Aaron,6 which called for immediate desegregation of the Little Rock
schools, was cacophonous and far reaching. 7 "What have these activist
judges on the United States Supreme Court wrought?" was the battle cry.
How can they simply strike down the Jim Crow way of life that was so
deeply embedded in the culture of so many states for centuries with the
sweep of a judicial pen? Wasn't that a matter for legislation and congressional action? The Supreme Court, in the minds of many, had gone way too
far and had made a mockery of the separation of powers in that the Court
was now legislating and usurping the role of Congress. These were activist
judges, the critics said, and that was clearly meant to be a pejorative term.
Surely, the framers of the Constitution had never intended judicial interpretation of the Constitution to have such far-reaching consequences, they
railed. Because the Justices had violated their oaths of office, they should be
impeached.
Earl Warren, as Chief Justice of the Court and author of the two Brown
decisions, became the poster child for the impeachment effort in the 1950s.
"Impeach Earl Warren" was the mantra, and signs to that effect, sponsored
2. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that doctrine of
"separate but equal" violates the Fourteenth Amendment); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka,
349 U.S. 294 (1955) (remanding to the federal district courts for orders necessary to admit
*the parties to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis "with all deliberate
speed").
3. 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding that "the Equal Protection Clause requires that the
seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population
basis").
4. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (announcing the exclusionary rule for invalid searches and
seizures).
5. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (establishing procedural safeguards
for defendants in custody prior to taking statements in order to secure privilege against selfincrimination).
6. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
7. See id. at 17 (holding that desegregation of Little Rock public schools should not be
delayed and that "the constitutional rights of children not to be discriminated against in
school admission on grounds of race or color ... can neither be nullified openly and directly
by state legislators or state executive or judicial officers.")
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by the private right-wing organization known as the John Birch Society,
popped up around the country and especially in the South. Drive him from
office, the critics howled, because he had expanded his judicial authority
unconscionably and exponentially. Never mind that the Warren Court was
unanimous in the Brown opinions and had performed its role of interpreting
state law in light of the United States Constitution. This, of course, dated
back to Federalist Paper No. 78 and to Chief Justice John Marshall, who
wrote in the seminal case of Marbury v. Madisons that the Constitution controls any legislative act "repugnant to it" and that it was the province of the
Supreme Court to say what the law is. 9 Never mind that the "separate but
equal" doctrine was odious and pernicious and clearly flew in the face of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as Mr. Justice Harlan had so perceptively understood and so eloquently put it in his dissent in Plessy v. Fergusonl° in 1896
where he alluded to our "color-blind" Constitution."
It was abundantly clear that Earl Warren's critics sought to retaliate
against the Chief Justice personally and the Court as a whole for decisions
they found to be abhorrent. It was retaliation, but it was also calculated intimidation designed to take the edge off constitutional interpretation in the
8. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
9. Id. Chief Justice John Marshall wrote:
It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter the constitution by
an ordinary act.
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts
must decide on the operation of each.
So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting
rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.
Id. at 177-78.
10. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
11. Justice Harlan stated:
But in view of the constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no
superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The humblest is the
peer of the most powerful. The law regards man as man, and takes no account of
his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved. It is therefore to be regretted that this high
tribunal, the final expositor of the fundamental law of the land, has reached the
conclusion that it is competent for a state to regulate the enjoyment by citizens
of their civil rights solely upon the basis of race.
Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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years to come and to stand judicial independence on its head. Looking back
these fifty years, it seems incredible that this effort to impeach Earl Warren
did. More than a million
would have gained any traction, but it certainly
12
Americans signed a petition for his ouster.
The Earl Warren impeachment effort was a frontal assault on judicial
independence, and we are all fortunate that it was unsuccessful. It failed, in
part, because wiser heads in Congress prevailed. There is no question that
what the Warren Court did in 1954 and 1955 was considered judicial "activism" by some at that time. Yet today it is almost universally acclaimed. As
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist said in January of this year: "Federal
Judges were severely criticized fifty years ago for their unpopular, some
might say activist, decisions in the desegregation 13cases, but those actions are
now an admired chapter in our national history.'
History tells us that repercussions following unpopular decisions are
not a new phenomenon. Thomas Jefferson, when president, was successful
in having Samuel Chase, a Justice on the United States Supreme Court, impeached for "unbecoming conduct" for a circuit judge in 1804, which was
"part of Jefferson's continuing assault on the Federalist-dominated judiciary.' ', 4 Justice Chase was impeached but not convicted. What the House of
Representatives charged Justice Chase with in that impeachment matter was
no high crime or misdemeanor, as required by the Constitution, but rather
Chase's alleged incompetence as a trial judge. Approximately 150 years
later, Justice William 0. Douglas of the United States Supreme Court was
also the victim of an unsuccessful impeachment attempt, following his grant
of a stay of execution to convicted espionage agents, Julius and Ethel
Rosenberg. We are also all familiar with President Franklin Roosevelt's
astonishing move in 1937 to dilute the impact of a majority of the United
States Supreme Court by adding six more justices. The Court at that time
had incurred the President's wrath by ruling certain New Deal measures
unconstitutional. Fortunately for the country, Roosevelt's effort was
thwarted by the United States Senate. 15
Chief Justice Earl Warren, of course, was a federal judge, appointed
essentially for life by President Eisenhower and subject to removal only if
he failed to conduct himself with good behavior or was convicted of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. 16 It is important to
12.
13.

See BILL SEVERN, MR. CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN 164 (1968).
Gina Holland, Rehnquist Backs Justices Life Terms, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE, Jan.

1, 2005.
14.

RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 718-19 (2004).

15. See ROBERT A. CARO, MASTER OF THE SENATE 58-63 (2002).
16. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts,
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour .... ). See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 ("The
President, Vice President and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from
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note that over the history of this country only fourteen federal judges have
ever been impeached and faced trials in the senate, and only seven have
been convicted. 17 Judicial rulings formed none of the grounds for those
fourteen who were impeached.' 8 Yet the threat of retaliation for unpopular
decisions remains, as evidenced by the efforts waged against Chief Justice
Warren and Justice Douglas.
Arkansas had its own brush with the impeachment of judges in the
nineteenth century during Reconstruction, including the impeachment of
Arkansas Supreme Court justices.19 These were largely matters of political
intrigue, and no convictions resulted.
B.

Procedures to Intimidate Judges

There are other questionable procedures, in addition to impeachment,
that can be used to retaliate against a judge for an unpopular ruling. Special
elections for judicial retention in states that have the Missouri Plan, where
voter turnout is typically low, are uniquely susceptible to manipulation by
special interest groups. Witness the defeat of Justice Penny White, in Tennessee in 1996, because she agreed with an opinion written by a fellow justice to send a death penalty case back to the trial court for resentencing.20
Tennessee Governor Don Sundquist weighed-in in opposition to Justice
White's retention. When asked whether it was a good idea for judges to
constantly be looking over their shoulders before making decisions, he replied: "I certainly hope So." ' 2 1 So much for judicial impartiality. And before
Justice White, in California in 1986, three justices of the California Supreme Court were defeated in retention elections due to their opinions or
votes cast on the death penalty in individual cases.22
A variation of the danger inspired by the special retention election is
the recall election. A judge issues an unpopular opinion, and recall petitions
office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and
misdemeanors.").
17. See Carl E. Stewart, Contemporary Challenges to Judicial Independence, 43 LoY.
L. REv. 293 (1997).
18. See id.
19. L. Scott Stafford, Judicial Coup D 'Etat:Mandamus, Quo Warranto and the Original Jurisdictionof the Supreme Court ofArkansas, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 891 (1998).
20. See State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18 (TENN. 1996) (vacating sentence of death and
remanding for resentencing).
21. Stephen B. Bright, PoliticalAttacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done Amid
Efforts to Intimidate and Remove Judges From Office for UnpopularDecisions?, 72 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 308, 310 (1997).
22. Chief Justice Rose Bird and Associate Justices Cruz Reynose and Joseph Grodin
were defeated in California in 1986 due to opinions or votes cast which were perceived as
being in opposition to the death penalty.
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are then circulated with regard to that judge requiring X number of signatures and calling for a recall election. The judge must then campaign against
his or her recall. That is a perfidious system. Why would any judge worth
his or her salt want to serve and make the hard decisions that the job requires with the threat of recall constantly hanging over that judge's head?
That is precisely what the recall mechanism is designed to do--intimidate
judges.
In 2003 Senate Bill 378 was introduced before the Arkansas General
Assembly to provide a procedure for the recall of judges. Under the original
legislation, a recall election could have been set in motion by a petition filed
with the signatures of fifteen percent of the qualified electors of the state. It
was widely viewed as a retaliatory measure designed to threaten judges who
had made unpopular decisions. The recall measure sailed through the Senate
by a unanimous vote but stalled in the House Judiciary Committee. Following an Attorney General's opinion declaring the recall bill itself to be in
conflict23with the Arkansas Constitution, the bill was unceremoniously laid
to rest.
Other efforts to retaliate against the judiciary by state legislatures are
equally suspect. For example, in this current session of the Arkansas General Assembly, bills were introduced to limit state courts from determining
the constitutionality of the school funding system and to limit the terms of
Supreme Court Justices. n Fortunately, neither bill has made much headway.
I am convinced that the procedures most states, including Arkansas, already have in place to protect against judicial wrongdoing are satisfactory
bulwarks. Arkansas, for example, has two such provisions in its state Constitution. The first is the standard impeachment and conviction process
vested in the General Assembly, when a judge engages in high crimes and
misdemeanors and gross misconduct in office.2 5 The second is the Judicial
23. 2003 Op. Att'y Gen. 104 (2003).
24. See 2005 Ark. H.J.R. 1009, § 1 and 2005 Ark. H.J.R. 1012, § 16.
25. See ARK. CONST. art. 15 § 1-3.
§ 1. Officers Subject to Impeachment; conditions
The Governor and all State officers, Judges of the Supreme and Circuit Courts,
Chancellors and Prosecuting Attorneys, shall be liable to impeachment for high
crimes and misdemeanors, and gross misconduct in office; but the judgment
shall go no further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or profit under this State. An impeachment, whether successful or not, shall be no bar to an indictment.
§ 2. Impeachment Powers of the House; trial by the Senate
The House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment. All
impeachments shall be tried by the Senate. When sitting for that purpose, the
Senators shall be upon oath or affirmation; no person shall be convicted without
the concurrence of two-thirds of the members thereof. The Chief Justice shall
preside, unless he is impeached or otherwise disqualified, when the Senate shall
select a presiding officer.
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Discipline and Disability Amendment, which amended the Arkansas Constitution and which was adopted overwhelmingly by a vote of the'people in
1988.26 This Amendment establishes a Judicial Discipline and Disability
Commission and provides for the removal of judges from office and other
sanctions for wrongdoing. And, finally, for those states, like Arkansas, that
have selection of judges by popular election, there is removal at the ballot
box.
To a considerable extent, federal judges are more immune from direct
assaults on their impartiality and independence than most state judges, especially because they have lifetime appointments and are not subject to removal by election. This is not to say that federal judges are immune from
politics, however. As much as I respect my federal counterparts on the
bench, a sense of being beholden to their appointer, the President of the
United States, appears to afflict some judges. The same sometimes holds
true for justices appointed by state governors under the Missouri Plan or to
fill a vacancy.
Perhaps the most recent egregious example of this was Judge Harold
Baer Jr., the federal district judge for the Southern District of New York,
who had been appointed by President Bill Clinton and who suppressed drug
evidence in a case in 1996. The suppression caused a firestorm in Congress
with more than 200 members in the House of Representatives calling for
Judge Baer's resignation.27 Senator and presidential nominee Bob Dole
went further and called for his impeachment.28 It appears that even President
Clinton considered calling for his resignation.29 Judge Baer then reversed
himself on the suppression issue and granted the government's motion for
reconsideration. Let me hasten to add that I have no idea whether Judge
Baer actually succumbed to political pressure. Indeed, some commentators
have maintained fervently that he did not.30 But the appearance that he did
defer to the will of the man who appointed him judge is palpable and if he
did so, judicial impartiality was grievously impaired.
What about the subtle pressures on state judges and particularly state
judges who are elected by a vote of the people? Is their judicial independence curtailed by capitulating to what they perceive to be the majority will
§ 3. Removal of Officers; Governor
The governor, upon the joint address of two-thirds of all the members elected to
each House of the General Assembly, for good cause, may remove the Auditor,
Treasurer, Secretary of State, Attorney-General, Judges of the Supreme and Circuit Courts, Chancellors and Prosecuting Attorneys.
26. See ARK. CONST. amend. 66.
27. Jon 0. Newman, The Judge Baer Controversy, 80 JUDICATURE, Jan.-Feb. 1997, at
156.
28. Id. at 158.
29. Id. at 157.
30. Id. at 164.
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on divisive issues? I have always supported the election of judges, believing
wholeheartedly in Jacksonian democracy. And I must confess to some displeasure in reading Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's concurrence in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, where she opines that if states that hold
popular elections to select their judges are experiencing the risk of judicial
bias due to free speech, those states brought this on themselves by selecting
judges by popular election.3'
But aside from Justice O'Connor's dubious and, yes, even, undemocratic comment, electing judges is no more political in my experience than
the appointment system. If anybody here today truly believes that federal
appointments or even state appointments to the judiciary are not political, I
have some excellent swamp land in the Arkansas bottoms I would like to
sell you. The federal appointment system merely calls into play a different
set of politics. In that regard, I had the honor of "campaigning" for Judge
Richard Arnold when he was considered for a seat on the United States Supreme Court in 1994. Justice Stephen Breyer ultimately was appointed, but
my campaigning and that of many others consisted of calling people of
prominence around the country and cajoling them to write President Clinton
on Judge Arnold's behalf. I must add as a footnote that it did not take much
cajoling.
Critics of judicial elections vigorously assert that the threat of removal
from office by judicial election throws a monkey wrench into the whole
concept of judicial independence. Moreover, they assert that political fundraising, even if the judge is not directly involved in soliciting money, is iniquitous and by necessity makes that judge beholden to certain individuals
or interest groups. I disagree strongly, however, that selection by election
automatically means a judge will not be impartial, objective, and independent or the judge will mold his or her decisions to what he or she perceives to
be the popular will. Of course, it depends on the man or woman. And to be
sure, demagoguery on the part of some judicial candidates can and does rear
its ugly head. But I am convinced that it comes down to the character of the
person who is serving as judge, whether that person is elected or appointed.

31. Justice O'Connor wrote:
Minnesota has chosen to select its judges through contested popular elections instead of through an appointment system or a combined appointment and retention election system along the lines of the Missouri Plan. In doing so the State
has voluntarily taken on the risks to judicial bias described above. As a result,
the State's claim that it needs to significantly restrict judges' speech in order to
protect judicial impartiality is particularly troubling. If the State has a problem
with judicial impartiality, it is largely one the State brought upon itself by continuing the practice of popularly electing judges.
White, 536 U.S. at 792 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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C.

Judicial Canons and Free Speech

I have already made reference to the Judicial Discipline and Disability
Commission established under Amendment 66 to the Arkansas Constitution,
which oversees judicial conduct and sanctions judicial wrongdoing. This
segues nicely into a different type of perceived impediment to the independence of judges which is very topical today and which is the subject of intense debate in virtually every state. Here, I am not talking about repercussions from the General Assembly or special interest groups for a judge's
unpopular ruling, but, rather, the conflict between, first, judicial candidates
and sitting judges who assert their right to free speech by speaking out on
issues, and, second, our canons of judicial conduct, which proscribe addressing issues or engaging in conduct in certain contexts. One aspect of
this debate is to what extent can a judicial commission such as we have in
Arkansas curtail or prevent a judicial candidate or a sitting judge from voicing opinions on any given subject?
1.

Code of Judicial Conduct

Arkansas like most if not all the states has adopted in large part the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct prepared and updated periodically by the
American Bar Association. 32 Initially, this Model Code was drafted in 1972
under the auspices of Arkansas' own lawyer and former president of the
American Bar Association, Edward L. Wright. This Judicial Code states in
its Preamble that it strives to strike a balance between judges using their
position to extract favorable treatment as one extreme, which of course is
verboten, and judges legitimately working at non-judicial tasks in their
communities and voicing their opinions on matters of importance to them.
Without question, the Code's ultimate purpose is to prevent a judge from
improperly using his or her judicial office to gain favorable treatment and to
eliminate the potential for conflicts of interest.
Another stated goal is to maintain the people's honor and respect for
the judicial office so that the public will maintain confidence in the judicial
system. On this point, it is worth noting that public respect for our system of
justice is high. According to one survey by the American Bar Association
taken in 1999, under the auspices of then-president Philip S. Anderson, seventy-nine percent of those surveyed were extremely confident or somewhat
confident with federal judges and seventy-five percent expressed the same
confidence with state judges. 33 The United States Supreme Court had the

32. See In Re The Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct, 295 Ark. 707 (1988).
33. See Perceptionsof the US. JudicialSystem American Bar Association (Feb. 1994).
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highest confidence rating of eighty-five percent.34 I will not tell you which
professions or government entities ranked the lowest.
To achieve these goals set out in the Code's Preamble, Arkansas' Judicial Code limits the activities of judges in several key respects. According to
the Code, a judge, for example, shall not:
A.

35
demean the judicial office.

B.

36
personally participate in the solicitation of funds.

C.
consult with an executive
or legislative body or official except
37
on matters concerning the law.
D.
solicit funds for, pay 38
an assessment to or make a contribution to
a political party or candidate.
E.

39
publicly identify his or her current political party affiliation.

F.
make statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate
with respect to40 cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court.
In 2002, the United States Supreme Court handed down a decision in
favor of the First Amendment and against state judicial codes which I have
already mentioned-Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.4 ' This fivefour decision struck down the Minnesota Judicial Code section that precluded a judicial candidate from announcing "his or her views on disputed
legal or political issues" on the basis that this prohibition abridged that candidate's free-speech rights.4 2 Currently percolating in the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals are collateral issues in the White case relating to whether
judicial codes can prevent a judicial candidate from directly soliciting funds
from potential contributors or from voicing a preference for a political
party. These issues were orally argued before the court, sitting en banc, on
October 20, 2004. The Arkansas Supreme Court and the State of Arkansas
have joined the amicus curiae briefs of sister states in support of the constitutionality of our Judicial Code provisions. Now the Bar and judiciary in
every state anxiously await the Eighth Circuit's decision, which will further
34. See id.
35. ARK. CODE
36. ARK. CODE
37. AK. CODE
38. ARK. CODE
39. ARK. CODE
40.

OF JUDICIAL
OF JUDICIAL
OF JUDICIAL
OF JUDICIAL
OF JUDICIAL
ARK. CODE OF JUDICIAL

41. 536 U.S. 788 (2002).
42. White, 536 U.S. at 788.

CONDUCT
CONDUCT
CONDUCT
CONDUCT
CONDUCT
CONDUCT

Canon
Canon
Canon
Canon
Canon
Canon

4A(2) (2005).
4C(3)(b)(i).
4C(l).
5A(l)(e).
5A(l)(f).

5A(3)(d)(ii).
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set the boundaries for judicial speech. Ultimately, I suspect the United
States Supreme Court will be called upon to make the final decision.
2.

Vagueness in the JudicialCanons

In one respect, the Arkansas Supreme Court has been ahead of the judicial curve in addressing the ripple effect of White on the free-speech rights
of sitting judges. In Griffen v. Arkansas Judicial Discipline & Disability
Commission,43 my court addressed the issue of to what extent our Judicial
Discipline and Disability Commission could prevent a sitting AfricanAmerican judge, not a judicial candidate, from consulting with AfricanAmerican members of the Arkansas General Assembly, known as the
Black
44
Caucus, on a legislative appropriation to the University of Arkansas.
In that case, my friend, Judge Wendell Griffen of the Arkansas Court
of Appeals, who is African-American, and who will have the last word today, made an appearance before the Black Caucus on March 18, 2002, to
advocate that the Black Caucus not "reward" the University of Arkansas by
appropriating more tax revenue for its programs, because, in his words, the
University mistreats black students, and previous appropriations have been
used to "maintain longstanding inequities. ' '4 He pointed specifically to the
university's firing of basketball coach Nolan Richardson, who had won a
national championship in 1995 .46 In his closing remarks, Judge Griffen told
the Black Caucus "to send a clear signal to the University" and added that
he did not believe the basketball coach at the university was fired for lack of
confidence in his leadership.47 He concluded: "send them a budgetary vote
of no confidence concerning sorry leadership about racial inclusion
over the
48
past years at the University of Arkansas. Show them the money!
Because of this and other statements Judge Griffen had made regarding
racism and Coach Richardson, he was charged by the Judicial Discipline
and Disability Commission with violating several provisions of the Judicial
Code, including Canon 4A(2), which prevents a judge from "demeaning"
the judicial office and Canon 4C(1), which prevents a judge from consulting
with legislators on matters not involving the administration of justice.49 After a hearing before the Commission, he was found guilty of violating
50
Canon 4C(1) for basically lobbying members of the General Assembly.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

355 Ark. 38, 130 S.W.3d 524 (2003).
See id.
Id. at 41-43, 130 S.W.3d at 526-27.
Id. at 42, 130 S.W.3d at 526.
Id. at 62, 130 S.W.3d at 538.
Id. at 62, 130 S.W.3d at 540.
Griffen, 355 Ark. at 44-45, 130 S.W.3d at 528.
Id. at 47, 130 S.W.3d at 528.
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He was admonished by the Commission for this offense by a vote of four to
three. 51 Throughout, Judge Griffen maintained that he was acting pro se in a
matter involving his personal interests, which was an exception to Canon
4C( 1).52
Judge Griffen appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court court, and we
reversed the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission and the admonishment by a vote of four to three. 53 In doing so, we focused on the judge'sinterest exception to Canon 4C(1). 54 The quandary for a majority of my
court was: What does the "judge's interests" mean? 55 Judge Griffen maintained that this exception meant he could voice his longstanding opposition
to racism, which was a personal interest of his. 56 At the very least, he maintained, the exception for "the judge's interests" was vague and unclear as to
exactly what judges were permitted to do.57
A majority of my court agreed with Judge Griffen and found the term
to be vague and ambiguous and, as such, repugnant to the First Amendment.58 I must confess that I wrote the majority opinion. Two dissenters,
however, opined that Judge Griffen knew he was wrong to lobby the Black
Caucus, and, for that reason, he should have been sanctioned. 59 They also
questioned how the majority could hold that a rule the court itself adopted
was vague. 60 A third dissenter wanted to revive a charge for another alleged
violation of the canons which the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission had already dismissed. 6'
As an aside, recently, I came across the words of Judge Richard Arnold
written last year for the Martin Luther King vigil at Philander Smith College
here in Little Rock. They address the issue of the all-important First
Amendment. Judge Arnold wrote
Even though the courts are not able to enforce a "Higher Law," as such,
and even though we would not trust judges with such power, the courts
are by no means impotent in the face of injustice

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id. at 44, 130 S.W.3d at 527-28.
See id. at 48-61, 130 S.W.3d at 530-39.
Id. at 48-61, 130 S.W.3d at 530-39.
See Griffen, 355 Ark. at 52-59, 130 S.W.3d at 532-38.
Id. at 52, 130 S.W.3d at 533.
Id. at 54, 130 S.W.3d at 534.
See id. at 60-61, 130 S.W.3d at 537.
Id. at 70, 130 S.W.3d at 543 (Corbin, J., dissenting).
Id. at 70, 130 S.W.3d at 543 (Corbin, J., dissenting).
Griffen, 355 Ark. at 61, 130 S.W.3d at 539 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
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In some ways, our highest calling is to make sure that the first amendremain open to
ment is observed and enforced. In doing so, we always
62
appeals like Dr. King's Letter from Birmingham Jail.
There is a very real conception on the part of some in our society that
judges should be insulated and isolated from their communities and that
they should only emerge from their caves bewigged and berobed from time
to time to decide cases and to hand down opinions. Otherwise, they should
remain hermetically sealed and eschew all public comment. In short, they
should do little more in the community than strike a judicial pose.
Quite frankly, that attitude is antiquated at best and somewhat quaint
and unrealistic. Moreover, voicing that view subscribes to an ideal that
never has really existed. It also would render our judges less than human,
which the Judicial Code expressly opposes. The commentary for Canon 4,
for example, reads, "Complete separation of a judge from extra-judicial
activities is neither possible or wise; a judge63should not become isolated
from the community in which the judge lives.,,
I did not agree with the comments Judge Griffen made to the Black
Caucus for reasons I will explain later. Yet voicing opinions on social issues, and race in particular, was not the real issue in Judge Griffen's case
before the Arkansas Supreme Court. No one seriously contends that Judge
Griffen was improperly flaunting his judicial authority before this group, or
threatening the Black Caucus with retaliation from the bench if the caucus
did not follow his advice and "send a message" to the University of Arkansas through the appropriation process. The core issue in the Griffen case was
whether the applicable Judicial Canon 4C(1), with the judge's-interest exception, adequately apprised Judge Griffen of when he was running afoul of
the Code. In other words, turning to the Code and reading Canon 4C(1),
would Judge Griffen have known what statements were permissible as falling under the rubric of "the judge's interests?"
Justice Scalia, in writing the lead opinion in the plurality decision of
White, concluded that the state has no compelling interest to support curbing
the speech of judicial candidates who wish to express their views on the
burning issues of the day.64 Of course, the United States Supreme Court has
not decided an issue similar to the Griffen issue. Yet, it is not too much of a
stretch to conclude that an ill-defined phrase in any state's judicial code
regarding what constitutes appropriate speech or, more specifically, what

62. Program for Martin Luther King, Jr. Day (Philander Smith College Jan. 12, 2005).
Reprinted remarks by Judge Richard Arnold made on Martin Luther King, Jr. Day (Jan. 19,
2004).
63. ARK. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4A cmt. (2005).
64. White, 536 U.S. at 788.
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constitutes lobbying on behalf of the judge's pro se interests, is in danger, at
least from a majority of the Supreme Court.
The Arkansas Supreme Court has now amended Canon 4C(l) to eliminate the judge's-interests exception in its entirety so that the prohibition
against judicial lobbying on matters other than the administration of justice
is unquestionably forbidden. But is this Canon, as amended, safe from First
Amendment attack? That remains to be seen. It may not be because now
Canon 4C(1) eliminates all lobbying by a judge to protect his or her "interests, whatever that term means.
What is more to the point is the question of whether now, in the wake
of White, all our canons of judicial conduct are constitutionally infirm if
they restrict speech. If so, are we now forced to rely on self-regulation by
our judges not to speak out on issues as our only protection? Also, and even
though a majority of my court held it was not a violation of the canons, was
it questionable judgment on Judge Griffen's part to lobby the Black Caucus
as he did, since his statements could come back to haunt him later in cases
which involve either the University of Arkansas or racial discrimination?
It is my strong belief that a judge can never disassociate himself or
herself completely from his or her judgeship. In this regard, what appears to
have offended Judge Griffen's critics the most, though he was not specifically sanctioned for this, is the fact that lobbying members of the General
Assembly on combustible issues like racism, a renown basketball coach,
and the University of Arkansas, demeaned his judgeship and public respect
for his position. But, again, is that a valid reason to limit his First Amendment rights? That is the issue. Today, under Arkansas' Judicial Code, the
answer is "yes," it is a valid reason for limiting free speech, if the judge's
conduct, including his remarks, undermines respect for the bench. Nonetheless, I am not totally sanguine that our Judicial Code will withstand constitutional scrutiny on this point, if ever challenged in the federal courts.
3.

Recusalfor Bias

Apart from the Judicial Code, however, public comment by judges on
popular issues has additional consequences. There is no question but that
commenting on a matter likely to come before a judge in a later case is dangerous practice and would be grounds for forcing a recusal of that judge on
the basis that he or she had already prejudged the issue. Indeed, as already
mentioned, lobbying members of the General Assembly on an issue like
systemic racism at the University of Arkansas or in our society at large
could conceivably subject Judge Griffen to motions to recuse on all cases
that (1) touch and concern racial discrimination; or (2) touch and concern
the University of Arkansas. Is that sufficient reason for judges to keep their
powder dry and not comment on highly inflammable matters likely to come
before them? I think so.
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Let's assume the doomsday scenario which is that the United States
Supreme Court will eventually strike down all judicial canons that in any
way curtail a judicial candidate or sitting judge from practicing his or her
right to free speech. What will be the safeguard against a judge hearing a
case where that judge's views on a central issue involved in that case have
already been made public? Just to be perfectly clear, I am not talking about
views expressed in a previous legal opinion, but rather views expressed in a
judicial campaign or in some other public forum.
The obvious answer is the recusal motion and allegations of bias by the
offended party. And if that judge does not recuse, after being requested to
do so by a party, there is the potential for appeal to a higher court and removal as a sanction. Nothing in my judgment undermines the public's respect for the judiciary as much as the perception that the judge is already
prejudiced in favor of one party on the issue at hand. The impartiality and
objectivity of the judge is compromised, and faith in a fair resolution of the
matter is shattered.
About three weeks ago, a federal district judge in North Dakota made
this point in the case of North Dakota Family Alliance v. Bader.65 In Bader
the judge struck down canons in the North Dakota Judicial Code as violating free speech, which forbade a candidate for judicial office from making
promises about the way the candidate would act in office, if elected, or
statements that would commit that candidate on issues likely to come before
the court. 66 The commitment-on-issues clause is similar to what we have in
Arkansas. The judge observed that he was convinced that White governed
dealt with "anthe "commitment" language even though that case expressly
67
nouncing views" rather than "committing" on issues.
The North Dakota case specifically dealt with whether a judicial candidate was prevented under the canons from answering a questionnaire
about social and family issues submitted by the North Dakota Family Alliance. 68 The court held that the candidate was not prohibited from answering
the questionnaire, but wrote the following:
Any judicial candidate who responds to a survey similar to the 2004
Voter's Guide Questionnaire may indeed create a serious ethical dilemma for himself or herself that would require recusal at a later date. It
is well-established that there is a judicial obligation to avoid prejudg-

65.
66.
67.
68.

361 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (D. N.D. 2005).
Id. at 1044-45.
Id. at 1028.
See id. at 1025-28.
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ment and all litigants are entitled to "an
impartial and disinterested tri' 69
bunal in both civil and criminal cases.
Amen.
Ultimately, it will rest with the appellate courts to decide bias and
recusal matters even if judicial free speech ultimately trumps our canons of
judicial conduct. And that in and of itself will become the protection that the
canons previously insured against judicial candidates or sitting judges
commenting on matters likely to come before them. It also offers some protection against judicial candidates who pledge to be "tougher" on certain
crimes. Accordingly, it is my view that the threat of removal of a judge
from a case for bias will foster judicial restraint on the part of our judiciary.
4.

JudicialActivism

As a final point, I want to return to the issue of judicial activism. I have
discussed the dire effect of curbing judicial independence by retaliating
against a judge for specific rulings. I have discussed restrictions on impartiality by a judge's self-imposed subservience to the popular will to assure
reelection or the desire to accede to the will of the executive who made the
judicial appointment. And I have talked about too much judicial independence-that is, a judge espousing views or taking actions that could later
subject that judge to allegations of bias and recusal motions.
But there is no more hotly debated issue than that of judicial activism.
A most recent example is found in two Supreme Court decisions involving
the death penalty. The first is Atkins v. Virginia,7 ° where the Court ruled that
the execution of the mentally retarded was cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, as viewed in light of
"evolving standards of decency."'7 The second is the very recent decision of
Roper v. Simmons, 72 which halted the execution of minors on the same
grounds. 73 Both cases relied on the 1958 case of Trop v. Dulles74 where the
Court first used the evolving-standards-of-decency test to determine if pun75
ishments are so disproportionate as to be cruel and unusual punishment.
The dissenters in both cases, with Justice Scalia leading the charge, excoriated the majority for setting public policy as the "sole arbiter of our nation's moral standards" by looking to opinions of foreign courts and to state
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.at 1045 (citations omitted).
536 U.S. 304 (2002).
Id.
125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
See id.
356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion).

75. See id-
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legislatures.76 How can the Supreme Court determine whether there is a
"national consensus" on a moral issue? Justice Scalia asked. This task, according to Justice Scalia, falls exclusively to the legislative branch of government. Should judges be deciding what classes of people should be excluded from the death penalty? He persisted. Isn't this simply expanding
Constitutional rights by judicial fiat?
In his dissent in the Roper case, Justice Scalia wrote:
What a mockery today's opinion makes of [Alexander] Hamilton's expectation, announcing the Court's conclusion that the meaning of our
Constitution has changed over the past 15 years - not, mind you, that
this Court's decision 15 years ago was wrong, but that the Constitution
has changed. The Court reaches this implausible result by purporting to
advert, not to the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment,
but to "the
77
evolving standards of decency,".., of our national society.

What Justice Scalia espouses, in the mold of Justice Felix Frankfurter,
is judicial self-restraint. And, to be sure, Justice Scalia's position does have
the beauty of ironclad simplicity and dogmatic charm. I for one champion
Justice Scalia's ongoing crusade to look to the plain meaning of words
when engaged in judicial interpretation. Yet surely this country and our
courts are not locked into interpreting what constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment in light of 1789 and 1791 moral and ethical standards. Is it activism then to acknowledge that our standards of decency with respect to
determining what is cruel and unusual punishment have evolved over the
past two centuries? I think not. And this is precisely what Chief Justice
Rehnquist acknowledged when he observed Chief Justice Earl Warren's
Brown decisions, which were anathema to some as judicial activism at the
time, are today almost universally praised. Justice Stevens, in his concurrence to Roper v. Simmons, makes the point even more cogently that had the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment been frozen in time, "it would impose
no impediment to the execution of 7-year-old children today. 78
Hence, while I question the Court's citation to foreign laws in Roper,
and while I agree with Justice Scalia that we should look to the plain meaning of words, I cannot conclude that justices who interpret what is cruel and
unusual punishment by looking to policy changes in this country as exemplified by state legislatures have violated the separation of powers and run
amok. I am simply disinclined to view the moral ramifications of the Eighth
Amendment through Ben Franklin's spectacles.

76. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1217 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77. Id.(Scalia, J. dissenting) (emphasis in original).
78. Id. at 1205 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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As can be readily gleaned from this paper, I abhor litmus tests for
judges, whether in the form of a question from a senator at a Senate confirmation hearing or a special interest questionnaire submitted during a political campaign. What flies in the face of judicial independence and impartiality more than placing an aspiring judge into a philosophical or legal strait
jacket by forcing a commitment on issues he or she will ultimately hear?
The point is our judges must remain persuadable on issues and not simply
be forced to adopt certain positions, which by definition means that judge
will be biased when that matter comes before him or her for resolution.
Moreover, I am more and more convinced that judicial activism is in
the eye of the beholder. You may want judges to be more active or less active in finding a remedy or expanding a constitutional right, depending on
what your philosophical or moral preference is.
Lest I end this paper on a negative note, let me say that I ultimately
have faith that our American judiciary is strong and will never founder on
the shoals of bias or partiality. After all, the American judiciary has withstood impeachment, court packing, and, for the most part, egregious demagoguery for more than two hundred years. Its independence is the envy of
the world and it forms the bedrock of our system of government. It is that
independence that inspires such great confidence in the American people.
That fact as much as any other convinces me that our citizenry will .never
allow our judiciary to be compromised or weakened in any serious respect.
Too much is at stake. As I began this paper, I will end it. I have great regard
for the wisdom of the American people. That leads to my conviction that the
independence of the American judiciary will continue to prevail.

